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History begins: shareholder value,
accountability and the virtuous state
CIARAN O'KELLY
Queen's University Belfast
Introduction
U nlike most previous recessions, the economic shock at the heart of the global
financial crisis from 2007 onwards was endogenous to the corporate form rather than
external to it. While the crisis was, in immediate terms, brought on by the end of a
property bubble - a more or less traditional end to a speculative frenzy in the United States
and some parts of Western Europe - the paradigm- shifting moment at the heart of the
financial crisis saw a series of structural failings brought to a head and their supporting
hypotheses - that markets are more or less perfectly efficient in their use of information
and that, as a result, markets will distribute societal resources in the least wasteful manner
possible - revealed as seriously flawed.
What of the corporate form itself? How are we to understand the company in the midst
of growing evidence about the structural vulnerability of financialised capitalism to
instability? This paper addresses the shareholder value paradigm as an accountability claim
for the corporation. Shareholder value mechanisms - predominantly in the form of
incentives to align the interests of management with those of shareholders - are regarded
as a more efficient means for corporate governance than external regulation or direct
shareholder control. Nevertheless, any accountability claim must be rooted in a sense of the
virtues that legitimate the claims. Without those virtues, mechanisms of control would
simply be free-floating uses of force by one section or another in society.
In large part, we must explore the gap between the portrayal of the company as an
accountability vehicle and the evidence for the accountability claims made regarding the
company. Moreover, we must understand these accountability claims, not as simple
descriptions of mechanisms (and the virtues that underpin them),2 but as claims on society:
claims for virtuous corporate governance are also claims over societal resources and claims
1 For a discussion of a long series of crashes, see C P Kindleberger and R Z ,\Liber, ,\laus, Panics and Crashes:
.1 bistot
, 
of financial crises 5th edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2005).
2 For a discussion of accountability mechanisms and virtues, scc M Bovens, "Two concepts of accountability"
(paper presented at the Kettering Symposium on Accountability, Kettering Institution, Dayton OH, 2008).
I use the term "virtue" simply to denote the moral content that must exist if some social arrangement is to
legitimate. A prolonged discussion, say, of the distinction between virtues and other normative forms is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 60(1)
to freedom from interference. Accountability in this sense is as much about the terms of a
virtuous society as it is about specific mechanisms and technologies of control.
For accountability mechanisms to be legitimate, they must take place in the context of
a specific moral community.3 Arguments that, say, efficiency ought to be taken as a
worthwhile goal for a society, can only have force in the context of arguments that provide
it with worth and meaning. As such, we have to see arguments over shareholder value as
arguments on behalf of shareholders against other possible claimants for corporate
resources. Legitimacy has to emerge from the formulations of a moral community either by
reconstructing the boundaries of the community or by placing new claims in the context of
existing norms. Of course, normative claims made against already existing norms are
subject to evidence and are testable.
The corporation is held up by agency theorists as an accountability vehicle.
Accountability is taken, at least by shareholder value theorists, to be the very raison detre of
the company. How are we to understand this sense of accountability? Patently, the
successful production of the more action-oriented orders of accountability within the
modern company has not stabilised market economies. It may, however, be wrong to say
that it has not served shareholders. It is possible that shareholders have been, at least during
periods of economic growth, content to trade on the basis of competition between
companies to innovate and to produce news that would be pleasing to the markets.
My purpose for the remainder of this paper is to examine three claims for shareholder
value. Taken together, these claims, for the company as an accountability vehicle that ties
managers to shareholders, rely on wider norms for their legitimation. They ought to be
seen as arguments about the shape of society rather than as simply being about the
corporate form. Accountability in these terms, is a matter of the struggle for resources: it
is a political device. Furthermore, the shareholder value framework is tied to testable claims
about how society works. These claims, it seems, either describe a company that never
existed or one that no longer exists. Certainly, the financialisation of capitalism has led to
the rise of the "postmodern'" company, oriented towards the production of spectacles for
stock market consumption rather than towards production in any traditional sense. I return
to this issue below. First, I address the three claims for the company as a shareholder value-
oriented accountability vehicle.
The shareholder value paradigm
The shareholder value hypothesis is one of the key hypotheses of the financialised
capitalism of the 1980s onwards.4 Seeming at times like an "all-purpose justification" for
every strategic management decision,5 the rise of the shareholder value paradigm, in
3 For a Smithian discussion of accountabilit formulated in moral communities, see S L Darvall, The Second-
person Standpoint: Moraly, respect, and accountabiiy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2006).
4 On financialisation, see J Froud, S Johal, A Leaver and K Williams, Finandaliation and Strategy: ,Narnr'e and
numbers (London: Routledge 2006);J Froud, A Leaver and K Williams, "New actors in a financialised economy
and the remaking of capitalism" (2007) 12 ."Cew Political Economy 339-47; J Froud, C Haslam, S Johal and
K Williams, "Shareholder value and financialization: consultancy promises, management moves" (2000) 2)
Economy and Soele
, 
80-110; G R Krippner, "The financialization of the American economy" (2005) 3 Soooecon
Re, 173-208; T A Kochan, "Beyond financialization: the era ahead" (2008) 30 Comparatin Labor Liw and Polii
Journal 89; K Williams, "From shareholder value to present-day capitalism" (2000) 29 Econont and Soceti I;
E Engelen, "The case for financialization" (2008) 12 Competilion and Change 111-19; N1 \glietta and
A Reberioux, Corporate Governance Adrift. A critique of shareholder valne (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing
Ltd 2005); G Jackson, "A new financial capitalism? Explaining the persistence of exit over voice in
contemporary corporate governance" (2008) 5 European Management Review 23-6.
5 Froud et al., FinandakZation and Strategy, n. 4 above, p. 38.
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scholarship and in the business world, has accompanied a major shift in the level of
appropriation of resources by a managerial class. The shareholder value paradigm that
served to divert resources even further towards a wealthy financialised class is itself driven
by a body of normative claims over how distribution ought to happen in society. These
claims underpin a system of accountability claims and mechanisms that reshaped systems
of corporate governance oversight in a way that allowed appropriation to take place and
destabilised the global financial system on the way. At their core, in other words, the
accountability mechanisms of the mainstream corporate governance paradigm - rather than
being normatively and ideologically neutral roadmaps to corporate clarity and honesty - are
profoundly flawed, albeit influential, political statements that have produced greater
inequality in the name of market egalitarianism.
The facts of appropriation are insufficient to explain the appropriation itself. The
explanation for why such a massive shift in societal power and wealth happened must lie in
a shift in the political foundations of society. The story of financialisation and recent crises
is not a story about gangs of "bad apples". It is about the philosophical shifts that took
place in the wake of technological and regulatory changes. Although sometimes articulated
as mere statements of fact, in other words, it is about ideology.
In their influential study of globalisation, shareholder value and the convergence of
company law, Hansmann and Kraakman present the Anglo-American model more or less
as afait accompli, their comparative corporate governance argument proposed that there is
"no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive
to increase long-term shareholder value". 6 Convergence in company law, they argue, ought
to enable shareholder-oriented corporate governance mechanisms worldwide, rooted as
they ought to be on "a broad normative consensus that shareholders alone are the parties
to whom corporate managers should be accountable, resulting from widespread
disenchantment with a privileged role for managers, employees, or the state in corporate
affairs" This normative consensus, they write, is based on the shareholder value's being
"the best means to aggregate social welfare". 7 Agency and contractual corporate
theorists draw on a range of conventional "normative" arguments for convergence on
shareholder value. Hansmann and Kraakman rely on the most common key defence of
shareholder value and of the enabling role that law ought to play in the promotion of
shareholder value: that is, that its benefits are a reflection of greater corporate, economic
and societal efficiencies. Sitting alongside the efficiency argument many company law
theorists defend shareholder value on general democratic or egalitarian arguments. Others
rely on an ownership argument: that shareholders, as property owners, ought to get their
just deserts, or a varient: that shareholder value arises from residual claims. I will address
ownership/residual claims and the democratic/egalitarian arguments for the shareholder
value accountability mechanism before moving on to the issue of efficiency.
Claims for shareholder value
OWNERSHIP AND RESIDUAL CLAIMS
The ownership argument is, on the face of it, the least persuasive defence of shareholder
value. 8 It is also the most normatively pure argument, in that it does not rely upon the
consequences of shareholder value's being enshrined in corporate practice for it to have
6 I1 Hansmann and R H Kraakman, "The end of history for corporate law" (2001) 89 Georgetown LmJourua/ 439.
7 lbid, p. 441.
8 See L Stout, "Bad and not-so-bad arguments for shareholder primacy' (2002) 75 Southern Caf}Jbruia Law
Review 1190.
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force. Rather, such is the force of the ownership argument that, even if shareholder value
produced inefficiencies, the argument that property owners ought to receive their just
deserts would still hold.
While the application of this argument to corporate governance rests with Milton
Friedman, 9 it, of course, has much deeper foundations in the origins of modern property-
owning capitalism. The idea of ownership is a common refrain in the business vorld and
the media as both providing a moral guide to directors and as an explanation for decisions
that have a negative impact on other internal stakeholders or on society at large. 10
To do otherwise than to orient corporate governance towards shareholders would be to
appropriate "other people's money". 11 Alternatively as the White Paper on British company
law in the run-up to the Companies Act 2006 had it, it is "crucial to effective corporate
governance that the owners of the company hold the directors to account for the
company's performance". 12 Ownership in these cases is valuable in itself and has positive
consequences for society as a whole (through effective corporate governance).
In some ways shareholder value is a throwback to the pre-Berle and Means ownership
model where ownership was regarded as an uncomplicated matter.13 The shareholder value
paradigm resurrects the owner (literally or in the residual claimant guise), but in a context
where the corporate princes are no longer connected in a tangible way to their property-
owning masters. Unfortunately, the ownership argument is neither normatively nor
empirically tenable. On the empirical claims, it is unclear how we ought to viewa shareholders
as owners in any meaningful sense. Share ownership does not, as a number of people have
pointed out, confer ownership of a company in the same way that one might own, say, a car
or a house. Shareholders do not have access to the company's assets. Nor does company
law confer much more than limited rights of control and governance. 14 Neither would
greater shareholder power in response to their supposed ownership rights be necessarily
desirable. 15 Company law does not confer any sensible ownership claim on shareholders,
9 M Friedman, "The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits" (1970) 122 (13 September) New
).rk Times Magazine 32-3; for a wider discussion of the place of Friedman's defence of shareholder value in
his overall I layckian framework, see R Chen and J Hanson, "The illusion of law: the legitimating schemas of
modern policy and corporate law" (2004) 103 1\leihgan Lin' Review 1-149; for a discussion placing Friedmanite
and Havekian theories in the context of the development of the British corporate economy, sec L Talbot,
Critical Contpaqe Law 1st edn (London: Routledge-Cavendish 2007), pp. 119ff.
10 Very often the frame serves both purposes. See e.g. Channel Four News, "Jon Snow interviews John Varley,
Chief Executive of Barclays Bank", 14 January 2009, ,-ww.channel4.com/news/articles/
businessmoney/extended+interview+ john+varley/2903807 (last accessed 3 February 2009).
11 Talk of "other people's money" draws from Adam Smith's discussions of the joint stock company. For
one discussion see D G Baird and M T Henderson, "Other people's money" (2008) 60 Stanford Law
Review 1309-44.
12 Department of Trade and Industry,, Vlodernising Company Law, White Paper (London: DTI 2002), para. 2.37;
for a discussion, see R Goddard, "'Modernising Company Law': the Government's \'hite Paper" (2003) 66
Alodern Law Review 402-24. For a recent discussion, see Department for Business Enterprise and Regulato
Reform, Implementation of the Directive on the Exerdse of Certain Rights of Shareholders in Listed Companies: A
consiltation document (London: BERR 2008), p. 55: "Principals need to effectively monitor and to some extent
control their agents to ensure that managers are acting in the best interests of the company's owners and that
the scope for moral hazard is minimised. . The proposed Directive aims to lower agency costs so that
shareholders can engage more effectively and ensure the companies that the), own are more efficient."
13 1, Dallas, "Two models of corporate governance: beyond Berle and Means" (1988) 22 Universi ' of .\1,ian
Journal of Law Reform 19-116.
14 See L E Mitchell, Corporate lrresponsibifi': Amencas newest export (New Haven: Yale UP 2001), pp. 119ff: Stout,
"Bad and not-so-bad", n. 8 above, pp. 1190ff.
15 L A Stout, "The mythical benefits of shareholder control" (2007) 93 1 irginia Law Reiew 789-809.
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although corporate governance la agency theory is obviously replete with expectations
about shareholder entitlements. 16
Nevertheless, the ownership argument founders on the fact that real shareholder rights
are only as extensive and sometimes less so than those of, for instance, creditors. Options
theory, Stout tells us, suggests that "it is not only misleading to say that dispersed
shareholders 'own' a public corporation, but that it is even questionable, from an economic
perspective, to say that a single controlling shareholder 'owns' a closely held firm after the
firm has issued debt". 17 After all, a creditor will have a greater call on the company's assets
in the event of the company being wound up. It seems more sensible, as Stout argues, to say
that the shareholder has traded a call-option on the company than to say that they "own" it.
The share as a commodity to be bought or sold has long loosened the tie between
companies and their members. 18 In this light, the shareholders' part of the deal has resided
for over a century not in the governance of the firm, but in the trading of shares as
"autonomous forms of property". 19 It goes without saying that technological and regulatory
changes have seen this commodification of the share intensify in the last twenty-five years.
Whereas, as recently as the early 1980s, the majority of shares on the London Stock
Exchange (LSE) were in private hands, that had fallen to 12.8 per cent by 2006. With foreign
(presumably largely institutional) investors owning 60 per cent of stock, private financial
enterprises own 44.4 per cent. That is, almost 75 per cent of domestically held stock is in
the hands of institutional shareholders. 20 Shareholders, in other words, have less and less
resembled owners in any conventional sense even as shareholder value rhetoric intensified.
Admittedly, the ownership argument in its Friedmanite sense is now regarded as
outdated by many contractarian corporate theorists.2 1 For "nexus of contracts"
theorists, 22 shareholders ought not to be regarded as owners, but as "residual claimants,
whose claims over corporate resources are not realisable until all outstanding contracts
16 For a discussion of expectations beyond law; see S Worthington, "Shares and shareholders: property, power
and entitlement (part 1)" (2001) 22 Compaq, Lnser 258-66; S Worthington, "Shares and shareholders:
property, power and entitlement (part 2)" (2001) 22 Company, Lsier 307-14.
17 Stout, "Bad and not-so-bad", n. 8 above, p. 1192.
18 P Ireland, "Capitalism without the capitalist: the joint stock company share and the emergence of the modern
doctrine of separate corporate personality" (1996) 17 Journal of Legal History 66-7.
19 Ibid., p. 42; see also Mitchell's account of the rise of the American shareholding econom, rooted as it was in
the promotion of speculative share ownership, not in ownership as such: L E Mitchell, The Speculation Economy
(San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers 2007).
20 Federation of European Securities Exchanges, Share Ownership Stricture in Europe (Paris: Federation of
European Securities Exchanges 2008), p. 83.
21 S Bainbridge, "In defense of the shareholder wealth maximization norm: a reply to Professor Green" (1903)
50 lli'ashitgton and Lee Law Review 1427.
22 On the corporation as a nexus of contracts, see F Easterbrook and D Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law (Cambridge L.: Harvard UP 1991); F Easterbrook and D Fischel, "The Corporate contract"
(1989) 89 Columbia Law Reiew 1418-48; L Kornhauser, "IThe nexus of contracts approach to corporations: a
comment on Easterbrook and Fischel" (1989) 89 Columbia Law Reiew 1449-60; K I tvak, "Frank Easterbrook
and Daniel Fisehel" in L Cohen and J Wright (eds), Pioneert of Lis and Economics (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
2008); NI A Eisenberg, "The conception that the corporation is a nexus of contracts, and the dual nature of
the firm" (1999) 24 Journal of Corporation Lau 819-36; E F Fama and MI C Jensen, "Separation of ownership
and control" (1983) 26Journalof Lauw and Economics 301-25; O Hart, "An economist's perspective on the theory
of the firm" (1989) 89 Columbia Law Retiew 1757-74, W Bratton, "The 'nexus of contracts' corporation a
critical appraisal" (1989) 74 Cornell Law Retiew 407-65.
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have been fulfilled". 23 "The contract structures of organizations limit the risks undertaken
by most agents by specifying either fixed payoffs or incentive payoffs", Fama and Jensen
tell us, so "the residual risk - the risk of the difference between stochastic inflows of
resources and promised payments to agents - is borne by those who contract for the rights
to net cash flows". 24 So shareholders, as residual claimants, deserve to have their interests
attended to because of their weak position, relative to other stakeholders, in the
distribution of assets from the firm.
Nevertheless, it is unclear how this takes us much further on from the Friedmanite
ownership frame. If, as Ireland puts it, under the residual claims frame, shareholders "vown
not 'the company' but 'the capital,' the company itself having been spirited out of
existence", 25 we are still left with many of the same problems.
For a start, "it is essential to recognize that the only time that corporate law comes close
to treating shareholders like residual claimants is when the firm is actually in bankruptcy." 26
Moreover, as with the ownership argument, the residual claims argument is not aimed at
empowering shareholders in concrete ways. Rather, it seeks to have managers simply attend
to shareholder value in making their decisions. This is quite a different thing, say, to
enforcing a dividend policy. Instead of seeking specific contractual or quasi-contractual
rights, the shareholder value paradigm simply seeks the acceptance of an "ought"
statement: that directors ought to have shareholders in mind when they act. Given this, the
residual claims argument, on these terms, does not give us good reasons for privileging
shareholders over stakeholders in a similar position when it comes to corporate governance.
Any normative appeal to the ownership or residual claimant arguments to claim desert
for shareholder primacy is bound up with these empirical flaws. First, as we have seen, given
the, at times, narrow range of relationships within the corporate architecture, it is difficult
to ascertain why shareholders ought to be privileged. Second, however, shareholding
ownership can in no way be regarded as sovereignty. Rather, shareholder value involves a
claim to a strange sort of delegated sovereignty. The agency relationship as described by the
advocates of shareholder value, with agents acting on the principal's behalf (though not, it
seems, at their behest), relies on agents presuming the principal's interests, as they develop
an agenda for the company's actions.
Finally, rather than setting out a norm for shareholder sovereignty arising from share
ownership, shareholder value seems to entail an especially inegalitarian version of property
norms, especially in terms of shareholder value's allowing directors to act "without regard
to the consequences to others".27 This Hayekian conceit leaves directors citing their duties
to shareholders as a defence for their actions and shareholders being so distanced from
corporate actions that they cannot be held responsible for corporate actions either. The
23 On residual claims, see E F Fama and M C Jensen, "Agency problems and residual claims" (1983) 26 Journal
of Law and Economics 327-49; B Klein, "Contracting costs and residual claims: the separation of ownership
and control" (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 367-74; J Macev' "Economic analysis of the various
rationales for making shareholders the exclusive beneficiaries of corporate fiduciary duties" (1991) 21 Stetson
L,' Reriew 23-44. A K Sundaram and A C Inkpen, "The corporate objective rcvisited" (2004) 15 Organialion
Science 350-63; 0 E Williamson, "Organization form, residual claimants, and corporate control" (1983) 26
Journal of Lan, and Economics 351-66; F H Easterbrook and D R Fischel, "Voting in corporate law" (1983) 26
Journal of Law and Economics 395-427; Eisenberg, "Conception", it. 22 above; Fama and Jensen, "Separation",
- 22 above; Hansmann and Kraakman, "The end of history', n. 6 above, p. 449.
24 Fama and Jensen, "Agency problems", .. 23 above, p. 3 2 8 ; see also Maccy, "Economic analysis", it. 23 above.
25 P Ireland, "Company law and the myth of shareholder ownership" (1999) 62 Modern Lin' Reinew 33.
26 Stout, "Bad and not-so-bad", n. 8 above, p. 1193.
27 Mitchell, Corporate Irresponsibifi n. 14 above, p. 122.
History begins: shareholder value, accountability and the virtuous state 41
corporate person, as Elizabeth Wolgast writes, is not "like using a stick to reach farther than
the length of one's arm". 28 While Wolgast argues that "if deliberation and choice are not
wedded to doing - which is to say, if the person who decides is not the one who acts - there
is strong reason for arguing a person's non-responsibility", 29 the company is arguably even
worse than she describes. The same person is "doing the deciding" and "doing the doing"
but, as the shareholder value paradigm has it, the decisions really belong to someone else.
Moreover, that "someone else" is very often the manager themselves, at least where they are
a beneficiary of stock options designed to align their interests with those of other
shareholders.30 Given this, in terms of any sensible conception of delegation responsibilit;
the corporation is a fiction within a fiction: it separates out responsibility to the point where
it simply does not exist. So, it is a vehicle for accountability that contains few if any of the
conventional characteristics or responsibilities associated with property holding. In this light,
the claim for shareholder value, articulated as a pure call on the moral attachment to just
deserts is actually, if anything, a liberation from accountability as conventionally understood.
DEMOCRATIC/EGALITARIAN ARGUMENTS
A second line of legitimating argument in underpinning shareholder value is the idea that it
is ultimately a democratic and egalitarian device. This argument has two main flavours. In
one, proponents of shareholder value point to the extension of shareholding through
pension funds, privatisation drives and other means as taking that share ownership is now
in many ways public ownership and, given that, shareholder value involves a democratising
of capitalism. As Hansmann and Kraakman say, with widespread share ownerships,
no longer do labor and capital constitute clearly distinct interest groups in society.
Workers, through share ownership, increasingly share the economic interests of
other equity-holders. Indeed, in the United States, union pension fumds are today
quite active in pressing the view that companies must be managed in the best
interests of their shareholders. 31
Indeed, not only is this shift virtuous in itself. It also places obligations of care on
directors that bring them back to the residual claimants argument, though now with added
moral force. As Peter Brabeck-Letmathe, CEO of Nestld put it: "Should we fail as a
business, it is [shareholders] retirement savings which are destroyed, so they're the primary
stakeholders of our company."' 32 This works on a practical level because the development
of layers of agents, it is supposed, will lead to the interests of "ultimate owners" being
attended to by the rise of the professional institutional investor. For Hansmann and
28 E Wolgast, Ethics of an Arificial Person: Lost responsibili6/ in professions and organizaions (Stanford: Princeton UP
1992), p. 65. Wlgast is arguing about the Hobbesian artificial person, but in manY' ways the modern corporate
person falls within the general ambit of Hobbes's concerns.
29 Ibid.
30 As Monks points out, one survey revealed that, by 1992, 97% of all stock options went to the top 15
individuals in each firm: R A Monks, "Redesigning corporate govcrnance structures and systems for the
twenty first century'" (2001) 9 Corporate Goternae: An international renew 143.
31 Hansmann and Kraakman, "The end of history", 1. 6 above, p. 452.
32 P Brabeck-lctnathe, "Creating Shareholder Value and Corporate Responsibility: Competing Goals?", speech
given at London Business School, 2006.
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Kraakman, the agency relationship driving investment funds will encourage greater
shareholder activism in enforcing shareholder value claims on corporations. 33
On the rise of the pension-fund democracy, the shareholder value argument relies on
three core ideas: first, that shareholdings have truly become more extensive in a meaningful
way; second, that shareholder value brings benefits to a greater range of people through this
extension of shareholding; and, third, to a lesser degree for our purposes here, that the
institutional infrastructure around this shareholding democracy is such that the promotion
of shareholder value is locked into the system.
As a normative proposition, it scarcely matters whether or not the rise of the
institutional investor actually facilitates a greater attachment to shareholder value than
would otherwise be the case,34 though it might be relevant to a wider discussion about
efficiency. On the whole, though, the first two claims - that shareholdings are more
extensive throughout society and that benefits accrue to increasingly indirect shareholders
- ought to be met with some scepticism.
For a start, while the benefits of increased private pension and equity holdings may
indeed accrue to a wider portion of the population, the benefits are disproportionately
concentrated among the already better-off.35 Indeed, while median household income for
the poorest 20 per cent of households in the United States rose by 14 per cent between
1980 and 2007, the incomes of the wealthiest 5 per cent of households rose by 72 per
cent.36 Measured through tax returns and including all capital gains, the top 1 per cent of
households had seen their share of all American household income rise to 20 per cent of
33 Hansmann and Kraakman, "The end of history", n. 6 above, p. 453; this argument is current in the UK's
corporate governance codes where it is imagined that the "enlightened" character of "enlightened shareholder
value" will arise from the interventions of institutional investors. See Financial Reporting Council, The
Combined Code on Corporate Governance (London: Financial Reporting Council 2008), s. 2; Institunonal
Shareholders' Committee, The Responsibilities of Institttional Shareholders and Agents - Statement of principles
(London: Institutional Shareholders' Comrmittee 2007).
34 Evidence is mixed, with some scholars and pobcymakers seeing potential in institutional shareholders (scc
A Shleifer and R W Vishny, "Large shareholders and corporate control" (1986) 94 Journal of Political EconornO,
461-88; Financial Reporting Council, Combined Code, n. 33 above, s. 2; Institutional Shareholders' Committee,
Responsibilities, it. 22 above) and others expressing some scepticism; for a more sceptical approach, sec J
Armour, S Deakin and S J Konzelmann, "Shareholder primacy and the trajectory of UK corporate
governance" (2003) 41 BritishJournal of IndustrialRelations 546, who argue that institutional investors with large
portfolios across a range of firms in any market "do not benefit from short-term gains achieved through the
operation of the market for corporate control. They are likely to take the view that takeover bids that result
in substantial gains for target shareholders bring them little gun if, over time, they do not produce enhanced
returns for shareholders in bidder companies, since they will most likely hold equit. stakes in both sets of
firms."; see also S Gillan and L Starks, "Corporate governance proposals and shareholder actvism: the role of
institutional investors" (2000) 57 Journal of Financial Economics 275-305; S Gillan and L Starks, "Corporate
governance, corporate ownership, and the role of institutional investors: a global perspective" (2003) 13
Journal of Appled Finance 4--22; j G Hill, "Visions and revisions of the shareholder" (2000) 48 American Journal
of Co parative Law 39; B R Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Controk British business transformed (Oxford: OUP,
2008), pp. 382ff; B Cheffins, "Current trends in corporate governance: going from London to Milan via
Toronto" (1999) 10 Duke Journal of Comparatis and International Lan, 13.
35 For a discussion of the distribution of equity and wealth, see P Ireland, "Shareholder pnrmacy and the
distribution of wealth" (2005) 68 Modern Law Review 58ff.
36 Census Bureau, "Historical income tables - households" at ww,acensu.gov/hhes/x-wwu/income/hisnnc/
h03AR.htnl (last accessed I February 2009); see alsoJ McNeil, Changes in ledian Household Income: 1 969 to 1996
Current Population Reports (\%sshington DC: Census Bureau of the United States 19)8); D \\cinburg, .1 Brief
Look at Postwar US Income Inequafi': Current Population Reports (Washington DC: Census Bureau of the United
States 1996).
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the whole by 2007, with 9 per cent in the hands of the top 0.1 per cent.37 The wealth of
people in the bottom decile was more or less static in real terms. Although the raw figures
are less stark in the UK, the patterns are more or less the same: the financialisation of
people's savings through pensions and other vehicles has not been an egalitarian
enterprise. 38 There is neither evidence of progressive redistribution (although there is
plenty of evidence of regressive transfers) nor of a "trickle down" of resources, where the
kinds of inequality that have developed in the last twenty years prove to be Pareto
optimal.39 Again, shareholder value theorists' aspirations to defend shareholder value on
normative grounds are as untenable as their empirical claims are unsustainable.
As the wave of privatisations and the privatisation of pension contributions transferred
vast public savings into the financial markets it is clear that, rather than wealth being
redistributed, it is increasingly concentrated among the wealthiest members of society. Of
these, financial capitalists have benefited the most. In the USA, the proportion of Wall
Street executives (that is, of financialised capitalists) in the ultra-rich income brackets has
increased markedly in the past fifteen years. 40 The transfers seem to have facilitated even
greater appropriation by financial elites as an intricate network of fees, bonuses and options
replaced the direct relationships between management and production.
In other words, ironically, the core motivator behind shareholder value and agency
theory - incentive-based work - did not empower the shareholder. Rather, it simply allowed
executives and people throughout the financial chain to divert vast resources to their own
pockets. Oversight is unlikely where brokers do not maximise returns either through
activism or even through long-term "investment" in a set of shares. Expecting long-term
relationships, as policy-makers in the UK do, is quixotic where
many fund managers feel unable to take long-term positions in companies, and
so their buy and sell decisions are driven by short-term movements in the share
price. The reason for this is that fund managers' performance is scrutinised by
their clients (pension and other investment funds) on the basis of quarterly
performance statistics.
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It is difficult, moreover to discern any shift towards long-term institutional share ownership
when, albeit for a variety of complex reasons, share turnover velocity on the LSE was 154
37 See A B Atkinson and T Piketty, "Income and wage inequality in the United States (updated to 2006)" (2008),
available at littp://elsa.bcrkeley.edu/-sacz/ (accessed 1 February 2009); this table is an update to T Piketty
and E Saez, "Income and wage inequality in the United States, 1913-2002" in A B Atkinson and T Piketty
(eds), Top lIcomnes Over the Twentietb Centur': -I contrast betiveen continental European and English-speaking countries
(Oxford: OUP 2007), pp. 141-225. and T Piketty and E Saez, "Income inequality in the United States,
1913-1998" (2003) 118,QuarteryJournalof Economics 1-39.
38 See Ireland, "Shareholder primacy", 11. 35 above, pp. 62ff, for a discussion.
39 See e.g. NI Aglietta and R Breton, "Financial systems, corporate control and capital accumulation" (2001)
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and Soae O, 433-66; Joseph Stiglitz, meanwhile, argues that even efficient markets may not be
Pareto optimal: J E Stiglitz, "Pareto optimality and competition" (1981) 36 Journal of Fi,ance'235-51;
futhermore, G A Cohen highlights that justice-based arguments for inequabties-as-incentives simply do not
hold as normative statements: G Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equafiy (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP 2008).
They may be of pragmatic consequence but only in the context of already existing injustices relating to
redistribution in society.
40 See S Kaplan and J Rauh, "Wall Street and Main Street: what contributes to the rise in the highest incomes?",
paper presented at the American Finance Association 2008 New Orleans Meetings.
41 \ Johnston, "After the OFR: can UK shareholder value still be enlightened? (2006) 7 European Business
OrganiZation La Retiea 836-37; see also I Anabtawi, "Some skepticism about increasing shareholder po er",
Law and Fconomics Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 05-16 (Los Angeles: School of La\%;
University (if California 2005); moreover, there is no definitive mamx for judging the divergent demands of
institutional shareholders. Pressure from one set of institutional shareholders may disadvantage others. See
I Anabtawi and L Stout, "Fiduciary duties for activist shareholders" (2008) 60 Staford Law ReLOew 1255-309.
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per cent in 2007, up from 40 per cent in 1990.42 This indicates that the mean stock holding
period on the exchange has fallen to "substantially less than 1 year". 43 Similarly, the annual
turnover of shares on the New York Stock Exchange went from 12 per cent in 1960 to 102
per cent in 2005.44 With each transaction, remember, comes an accumulation of fees.
Further to this, we must remember that institutional investors suffer from the same
agency problems that they're supposed to solve. The only difference as we move up the
chain through pension funds and the like is that the information disadvantages of ostensible
principals vis- -vis their agents are even more glaring. Incentives for agents to work on their
clients'/principals' behalf would only work in the presence of a coherent and accessible
market for financial services. But there is no market. People lack the information to choose
between pension or savings products. Or, more starkly, if their savings come straight out of
wages through workplace schemes, then any link between demand and performance may all
but break. Given that many people do not use their savings in this manner out of
entrepreneurial or enterprising ambitions, but because the devaluation of other alternatives
(pensions funded by taxation for instance)45 has left them with little in the way of choice,
it is difficult to expect that they devote their energy to performing oversight over their
agents in distant and impermeable financial markets.
Finally, as events in the past decade have shown, rather than unleashing enterprise or
improving the lot of the individual, the financialisation of savings has transferred
substantial risk to the individual. With increasingly volatile portfolios in decline at many
points in the last decade, contributors to pension funds are essentially forced to bet on the
health of the markets at their point of retirement. Rather than being focused on
shareholder value, the rise of the shareholding democracy has simply delivered greater
appropriation by managers and financial intermediaries, a massive transfer of risk to
individuals and a regressive redistribution to the wealthier members of society.
Again, as with ownership claims, co-opting convention norms about democracy into the
legitimation of shareholder value is normatively and empirically untenable. The company,
by these terms, is not an accountability vehicle in any conventional sense at all.
EFFICIENCY ARGUMENTS
Once we dispense with the democratic/egalitarian argument, it becomes difficult to regard
any efficiency arguments as having any particular force. Nevertheless, the attachment to the
social benefits of efficiency is prevalent in the literature. 46 While efficiency can have no
normative force in and of itself, it is an important component in general Hayekian schema
for the market: that blockholding interests will be driven out in favour of more productive
parties. Benefits to all stakeholders and even general social welfare will follow. Efficiency is
42 World Federation of Exchanges, Turnover 1I'elod
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Exchanges 2007); see also table in A Pendleton and H F Gospel, "Markets and relationships: finance,
governance and labour in the United Kingdom" in H F Gospel and A Pendleton (eds), Corporate Governance
and Labour Alanagement (Oxford: OUP 2005), p. 73.
43 D Walker, Guidelinesfor Disclosure and Transpareng' in Private Equimy (the Walker Report) (London: British \'cnturc
Capital Association 2007), p. 10.
44 T Clarke, International Corporate Governance: A conparative approach (London: Routledge 2007), p. 238.
45 Ireland, "Shareholder primacy", n. 35 above, p. 53.
46 Agency theory is based on an efficiency model-based description of the company. See Fama and Jensen,
"Scparation", n. 22 above; Fama and Jensen, '\gency problems", n. 23 above; NI C Jensen and \\ H Meckling,
"'Iheory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure" (1976) 3Journal Of Financial
Eco,,omtcs 305-60; M C Jensen, "Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective function"
(2001) 14 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance; Easterbrook and Fischel, Economic Structure, n. 22 abvc;
K Eisenhardt, "Agency theory: an assessment and review" (1989) 14 Academy of Management Review 57-74.
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the core principle driving the shareholder value paradigm in corporate governance and is
held to be the core driver of company law. Moreover, the purported efficiency of the
shareholder value paradigm is regarded as one of the strong forces behind any
convergence on shareholder value: more efficient companies and regimes will drive the less
efficient ones out of the game.
47
The problem with the efficiency argument is that it is very difficult to formulate an
evidence basis for a claim that a particular economic system or system of governance is
more or less efficient than any other.48 While it is possible to identify individual
inefficiencies as they arise it is not possible to come up with a systematic sense of efficiency
beyond a general assertion that it is a necessary consequence of unfettered markets. First
off, the link between shareholder value and efficiency is tautological: efficiency is described
as anything that delivers shareholder value while shareholder value is legitimated on the
grounds that it is efficient.
It is not clear at any point what precisely shareholder value might entail. All
shareholders may not have entirely common interests or motives. 49 At the very least they
may define share values as counting over different time scales. It is unclear that shareholder
value actually does provide a clearer and more transparent incentive upon which directors
might build their strategies for the firm and it is certainly difficult to sustain the idea that
attending to shareholder value is superior because "shareholder value is a single-valued
metric that is also observable and measurable". 50 It is not necessarily a single value and
observation and measurement do not float free of decisions as to what strategies will count
as enhancing shareholder value. So, while a multi-stakeholder approach may well "permit
managers and directors to serve no one but themselves, '51 it is not clear that a shareholder-
orientation will do any better.
How, indeed, can strategies designed to enhance shareholder value actually do so in any
obvious way? The development of management consultancy-driven shareholder value-
oriented reforms in corporations, while heavy on rhetoric, have tended to be rather light on
actual reform. Rather, once we push past the construction of new forms of story to tell
market actors, shareholder value strategies appear to be little more than "a good deal of
tautology combined with a fairly traditional 1980s concept of strategy". 52 What the
shareholder value rhetoric is good at, however, is the production of short-term bounces as
firms are seen to be intensifying their focus on shareholder value through the ostentatious
adoption of new strategies or, indeed, new boards and CEOs. 53
Whose efficiency ought we to privilege? As Williams points out, drawing from Lazonick
and O'Sullivan, through the 19 70s, "most US corporations retained and reinvested earnings
which provided the economic dynamic behind broadly based prosperity". Since the 1980s,
47 Hansmann and Kraakman, "The end of history", n. 6 above, p. 442. \ Keay, "Ascertaining the corporate
objective: an entity maximisation and sustainability model" (2008) 71 Modern Law Rtienw 668,
48 See R Ball, "What do we know about stock market 'efficiency'?", unpublished manuscript (Universitv of
Rochester: William E Simon Graduate School of Business Administration, Managerial Economics Research
Center 1989).
49 Kcav, "Ascertaining the corporate objective", -. 47 above, p. 670; e.g. on possible conflicts between
institutional and other investors, see T \Voidtke, "Agents watching agents? Ividence from pension fund
ownership and firm value" (2002) 63 Journal of Financial Economics 99-131; Anabtawi, "Some skepticism",
- 41 above.
50 Sundaram and lnkpen, "The corporate objective revisited", . 23 above, p. 355.
51 Nlicc., "Iconomic analysis", n. 23 above, p. 36.
52 Iroud et al., Financialitaion and Strategy. ,. 4 above, p. 47.
53 For one story of a market spectacle-driven search for new leadership, see R Khurana, Searchingjora Corporate
Savior: The trrahtonalquest.rlorcbanmahc CEOs (Pnnceton NJ: Pnnceton UP 2002), pp. 1-19.
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however, "there has been a 'transformation of US corporate strategy' around the principles
of downsizing the corporate labour-force and distributing earnings to shareholders". 
4
Why, rather than adopting an efficiency rule where directors would "maximize the sum of
all the risk-adjusted returns enjoyed by all of the groups that participate in firms", 55 would
shareholder value be privileged? Part of the answer must lie in the fact that shareholder
value is not an efficiency maxim at all. Rather, it is a "a power relationship, that is a particular
(societal) way to design a corporation". 56 Convergence on shareholder value is not a matter
of convergence on efficiency. Claims about accountability are about these relationships, not
about formal processes of agent-control. It is a set of political decisions as to how
resources ought to be distributed in society. It is riven with value judgments and decisions,
masquerading as neutral forces.57
FINANCIALISATION AND FINANCIAL CRISES
The three defences of shareholder value are worth taking seriously, given that they provide
the backdrop to economic life in corporate economies. Moreover, they bring a focus on what
precisely is meant in political and business parlance by corporate accountability. Nevertheless,
they are neither empirically nor normatively sustainable in and of themselves. The normative
dimension is in many ways the most important, given that accountability claims have always
involved the construction of normative frames within which people ought to work. That is,
the appeal to accountability is never merely a matter of brute force nor a matter of simple
expediency. It is a plea for a certain claim to power over (in this case) the company to be
honoured by society at large. Or, to put it differently, accountability is a "second-person
standpoint", that occurs within and helps sustain or transform a moral community.
58
Furthermore, we have to understand the manner in which the shareholder value claim,
and myriad specific claims that follow from it, has sought to reconfigure the moral
community in line with the opportunities provided by the technical and regulatory
innovations behind the financialisation of corporate economies and corporate governance.
It goes without saying that managerial appropriation is scarcely new. As Lawrence Mitchell
and Paddy Ireland point out, large industrial corporations, in both the United Kingdom and
the United States, originated in large part from the desire of proposers to extract investment
and speculative capital from a growing class of investors. Industry, in these terms, is carried
on, not for the sake of production, but "for the sake of business", 59 or, to be more precise,
the business of market accumulation.
Primary among the features of financialised capitalism is the hyper-innovative character
of the markets, driven by "the growth in the liquidity of capital markets, expressing increases
in the breakdown and transfer of risks", and by "the upsurge, in these same markets, of
54 Williams, "From shareholder value", n. 4 above, pp. 3-4.
55 Stout, "Bad and not-so-bad", n. 8 above, p. 1198.
56 \ Rebeioux, "'European style of corporate governance at the crossroads" (2002) 40Journalof Common Market
Studies 119.
57 See G M Frankfurter and E G McGoun, "Ideology and the theory of financial economics" (1999) 39 Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization 159-77.
58 See Darwsall, The Second-person Standpoint, n. 3 above; C O'Kelly, 'A politcal theory of accountability" in
NI Dubnick and H G Frederickson (eds), Accountabi/i ' and its Promises (New York: NI E Sharpe 2009).
59 Mitchell, The Speculation Economy', n. 19 above, p. 13; Ireland, "Capitalism", n. 18 above; P Ireland, "H-istory,
critical legal studies and the mysterious disappearance of capitalism" (2002) 65 Modern Law Re,7eu, 106-19;
Ireland, "Company law", . 25 above.
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investment funds, responsible for the management of continually increasing savings" 60 and,
finally, the "mass-marketing of financial products to consumers". 61 Financialised capitalism,
"oozing with instability", 62 has not seen the democratisation of capital but the capitalisation
of savings through institutional investors, driving a systematic reliance "on the constant
searching out, or the construction of, new asset streams, usually through a process of
aggregation, which then - and only then - allows speculation to take place".
63
This hyper-innovative system is combined with the enlisting of internal and external
gatekeepers and financial intermediaries through a dense network of fees and bonuses.
While these are designed to incentivise individual behaviour, massive hazards emerge in
terms of risks that resources would be appropriated as everyone is brought inside the
financial flow The notions upon which agency theory is based - gatekeeping, governance
and private regulation - all break down. 64 Instead, innovation takes on a life of its own
when intermediaries develop "a stake in an economy of permanent restructuring", beyond
the production of value "because deals (be it acquisition or demerger, new issues or
buybacks, securitization or rebundling risks) are the source of fees". 65 In fact, the amounts
of money circulating through financial and equity markets far exceeds those circulating
through the "real" economy.66
Enron
Enron holds a totemic place in the development of this process. Enron was, in hindsight,
the quintessential financialised company of the new millennium. Enron's self-consumption
occurred in the midst of an incredibly complicated set of financial arrangements as the
company first attempted literally to transform itself into a set of markets and then as
managers, with lucrative collaboration from gatekeepers, 67 set about appropriating the
company's resources. The key to Enron's success was that it could financialise
infrastructural products like electricity, gas or broadband. By constructing market
instruments in these products, Enron hoped to collect at both ends, so to speak. The
company would not only trade in the products, but would collect a fee for each trade that
third parties made on their market. Enron's executives were aggressive in their pursuit of
relationships with auditors, ratings agencies and banks, all of whom made vast profits from
60 Aglietta and Reb6noux, Corporate GoiernanceAdrift, n. 4 above, p. 1; See Froud et al., "New actors", n. 4 above,
pp. 339-40; A Lcyshon and N Thrift, "The capitalization of almost evcrything" (2007) 24 Theory, Culture &
Society 97-1 15.
61 Froud et al., "New actors", n. 4 above, p. 340.
62 Aglietta and Rebdrioux, Corporate Governance Adrift, n. 4 above, p. 183.
63 See also Icvshon and Thrift, 'The capitalization", n. 60 above, p. 98; the risks of financialisation wcre pointed
to as earlyN as the mid-1980s by the Committee on the Global Financial System, Recent Innovations in International
Banking (The Cross Report) (Geneva: Bank for International Settlements, CGFS Publications 1986). pp. 187ff.
64 See J Coffee, Gatekeepers: The professions and corporate governance (Oxford: OUP 2006).
65 P Folkman, J Froud, S Johal and K Williams, "Working for themselves, Capital market intermediaries and
present day capitalism" (2007) 49 Business History 561; On compensation packages, scc P Bolton, J Scheinkma
and W Xiong, "Executive compensation and short-termist behaviour in speculative markets" (2006) 73 Review
of Economic Studies 577-610.
66 R Dore, "Financializanon of the global economy" (2008) 17 Industrial and Corporate Change 1097-112.
67 Indeed, Andcrson, F nron's auditor, made millions from consultancy services aimed at assisting Enrons
managers construct the sham special vehicles that Anderson ought to have exposed in the audit. See
\V Bratton, "Enron and the dark side of shareholder value" (2002) 76 Tulane Lau, Review 1350.
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the provision of non-audit services, ratings on financial products and the construction of
Byzantine financial manoeuvres. Its collapse followed as managers took reckless risks and
strove to obscure huge losses as various speculative ventures went badly wrong.68
While the manner of Enron's death was ultimately conventional in many ways, in that
the company added a variety of bad bets to existing bad debts,69 the cause of its death lay
with the sequence of financial bets that Enron made, the linking of its stock market value
to its financialised products and, to a lesser extent, the appropriation of company assets by
directors. Moreover, the directors' activities could not have been possible without
gatekeepers' collaboration, itself facilitated by a network of fees and bonuses. Enron's
directors, when the company was apparently successful, were aggressive in their
manipulation of financial disclosure so as to present the most advantageous returns to the
stock market. This in turn allowed the markets spectacularly to overvalue the company.
The political and media narratives at the time were that the Enron collapse was down
to a need to make companies more "accountable to shareholders". However, this begs the
question of whether Enron's capacity to get away with the confection of success it created
was more a result of managers obscuring information or of many shareholders not being
motivated to question that information in the first place? On the one hand, "one thing that
did contribute", to the company's collapse "was Enron's willing embrace of the favorite
governance 'reform' fad of the 1990s, stock options". 70 In one sense, Enron collapsed in
an era when shareholders were already the focus. The problem was that that focus was
simply a vehicle for appropriation on the part of the directors. The proper incentives were
also perverse incentives.
Added to that, a concern for actual performance only matters to long-term investors if
they either cannot exit or will not exit (in the case of people or institutions whose
shareholding is motivated by considerations other than market values). In other cases, when
the share is not treated as a fact of ownership but as a tradeable commodity and where the
stakes in companies do not go beyond the sentiment of market players, a corporation's
reputation for success will continue until the point when uncritical sentiments about the
stock, driving bids higher and higher, are replaced by deflation as demand slumps and those
at the top of the pyramid are left with losses. The important thing for the investor is not to
be the left carrying the can when the slump hits.
It seems, however, that the Enron and other collapses in 2001-02 were harbingers of
68 Bratton, "Enron", n. 67 above; H Butler and L Ribstein, The Sarbanes-Oxley Debacle: How tofix it and what we'e
learned (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute 2006); S Deakin and S Konzelmann, "Learning from
Enron" (2004) 12 Corporate Governance: An international review 134-42; J Gordon, "What Enron means for the
management and control of the modern business corporation: some initial reflections" (2002) 69 Universiy of
Chicago Law Review 1233-50; P MI Healy and K G Palepu, "The fall of Enron" (2003) 17 Journal of Economic
Perspectives 3-26; D Kershaw; "Waiting for Enron: the unstable equilibrium of auditor independence
regulation" (2006) 33 Journal of Law and Sodet, 388-420; M Klock, "Two possible answers to the Enron
experience: xxil it be regulation of fortune tellers or rebirth of secondary liability?" (2002) 28 Journal of
Corporation Law 69-109; Coffee, Gatekeepers, n. 64 above; for a series of journalistic accounts, see B Cruver,
Enron: A-natomji' of greed - the nnshredded truth from an Enron insider new edn (London: Arrow Books 2003);
P Elkind and B McLean, The Smartest Gi0's in the Room: The amazing rise and scandalous fall of Enron new edn
(Harmondsworth: Penguin 2004); P C Fusaro and R Miller, Il"hat WIletnt 11-rong at Enron (Chichester: John Wiley
& Sons 2002); see also special issues on Enron in "Symposium: Enron" (2002) 35 Connectict Ln' Review
915-1254: "Symposium: lessons from Enron, how did corporate and securities law fail" (2003) 48 1 '"imnoto
Law Review 989-1280.
69 D Langevoort, "The organizational psychologv of hyNpcr-competition: corporate irresponsibility and the
lessons of Enron" (2002) 70 George 'ishington Law Review 974.
70 Stout, "The mythical benefits", - 15 above, p. 808.
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the greater crisis that hit Anglo-American capitalism in 2007. While immediately caused by
a property bubble, and thus fitting in with a long line of financial crashes,
71 as I said in the
introduction, the financial crisis was down to corporate governance: to structures
endogenous to the corporate form itself. The range of incentives available to executives and
to intermediaries and the ceding of oversight power to financial markets led to the pursuit
of highly risky but spectacular products that, through the externalising of risk, produced
illusory liquidity for the financial services sector. The problem was not about bad decisions
in and of themselves. It was about the development of a system that required bad decisions.
To pursue the safe path would have been to lose favour with the markets and, ultimately, to
lose one's position. In these circumstances, fmancialisation means that the founding conflict
between principals and agents, upon which agency theory is based, simply disappears.
While "the tradability of securities and the liquidity of markets allow firms to escape the
sphere of ownership", 72 the share has been placed in a pre-eminent position in corporate
governance. This shift has led to the birth of what might be called the postmodern
corporate form, where totemic information takes the form of news that will lead to positive
share movements. Increasingly volatile markets are as prone to spectacles, such as the
introduction of new CEOs or innovative though risky financial investments that exploit
"stock market crazes", 73 as they are to actual production. Moreover, market actors have
relied on, or simulate a reliance on, verification from gatekeepers that are themselves deeply
implicated in the fees structures surrounding new products.
While it is possible that share price movements might be related to increases in
production or revenue or profit, it is by no means necessary that this would be the case.
Information might be produced through corporate governance reform, but it might just as
well be produced through reforms to the means by which information is conveyed, by
focusing on the short-term to the detriment of long-term value creation, or simply by
paying homage to the important norms of shareholder value. These all involve management
of shares rather than of companies in the sense that the corporation is reconfigured so that
its function is the production of information for dissemination to stock markets.
Conclusion: back to accountability
It would also be wrong to say that the corporate economy and the corporate form has been
entirely unsuccessful in reconfiguring moral communities around shareholder value, at least
when it comes to the community of corporate and economic elites. The key has been for
the discourse of this communitn, to be extended and accepted in society at large. In these
terms, the most important role of shareholder value in the context of financialisation and
the postmodern company has been to expand the influence of the shareholder value story
beyond the moral sub-community within which it might best resonate. The accountability
story at the root of shareholder value has also been very successful in insulating the
company from external scrutiny and control. The processes and procedures put in place,
while expanding the sphere of accountability, and while displaying more publicity than has
ever existed before in economic vehicles, has actually served to close down external scrutin,
both by giving the appearance of a self-regulatory system (and thus an argument against
external regulation) and by actually obscuring wrongdoing.74 Accountability' in these terms,
71 As described by Kindleberger and Aliber, Manias, Panics and Crashes, n. I above.
72 \gleitta and Rebhrioux, Corporate GorernaneAdrifi, n. 4 above, p. 264.
73 Ibid., p. 97.
74 For a discussion 4 these penis in accountabili-; see R Mulgan, "'.\ccountabiiv': an ever-expanding
concept?" (2000) 78 Public.Admi ,istraton 555-73.
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is less about delegated control and more about the struggle to both dominate a social (in
this case corporate) sphere and to insulate it from other stakeholders.
Claims about accountability are, in these circumstances, claims about politics. They are
claims about the terms of virtue in a given society: how that society ought to be organised.
When appeals are made to the wider norms of moral communities, the normative core of
an accountability discourse is rendered testable. Normative claims are made in the form of
empirical claims.
My aim in this paper is not to argue that the shareholder value paradigm as a rallying
point for corporate governance is at an end. As Brian Cheffins has pointed out regarding
the UK's legal structures, it is very likely here to stay.75 What has changed, however, is the
idea of shareholder value as a defensible ideal for corporate governance, at least in the
context of wider social norms. Shareholder value is now a convention in search of a
justification as the fiction of rational market efficiency dies a death that has turned out to
be painful far beyond the boundaries of the company.
75 Cheffins, Corporate Owmership, n. 34 above, pp. 401 ff.
